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Abstract
This paper investigates the role of productivity as a determinant of the worker’s
retirement intentions. Using an overlapping generation framework, we analyze the
retirement decision of a cohort of workers being ability heterogeneous. The labor
market is endogenously segmented between workers having the required ability level
to occupy jobs where the productivity is indexed to the technological state via
on-the-job training (complex jobs) and the rest of workers, who are employed in
positions where productivity is relatively deteriorated in case of technological change
due to the absence of on-the-job training (simple jobs). In case of technological
change, workers in complex jobs delay their retirement date, whereas workers in
simple positions will not modify their retirement decision unless taxes change. Using
data from France, we find that after a technological change, older workers who benefit
from a skill upgrading training program have a higher intended retirement age.
JEL: J14; J22; J24; J26
Keywords: OLG; Retirement intentions; Technological change; Training
1 Introduction
Many papers have highlighted the negative effect of technical change on older workers’
employment rate (Bartel and Sichermann (1993), Aubert et al. (2006), Beckmann (2007),
Ronningen (2007) or see Ahituv and Zeira (2011)). They argue that the development
of new information and communication technologies accelerates skill obsolescence and
reduces therefore both the labor demand and the labor supply of older workers. Little
attention has been paid to the impact of technical change on retirement intentions,
particularly when it is possible to update the worker’s skills.
This paper is an attempt to fill the gap. We investigate how technological change may
affect the intended exit age of older workers, both from a theoretical and empirical per-
spective. We underline the major role of productivity as a determinant of the worker’s
retirement intentions. The originality of this work consists in showing that technological
progress can actually delay the retirement decision of a worker if the worker’s skills are
updated (via on-the-job training) by the firm. Our paper combines two streams of litera-
ture. On the one hand, our work is based on papers analyzing the retirement decision of
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workers. On the other hand, we employ all the literature interested in on-the-job training
issues.
The most recent literature dealing with retirement decision issues focuses on the
demand side, and more precisely, on the impact of technological changes on hirings,
firings or the share of seniors in the workforce (see Aubert et al. (2006) for France or
Borghans andWeel (2002) for the UK). Ljunqvist and Sargent (2008), Cheron et al. (2013)
and Saint-Paul (2009) support the view that it is not in the interest of firms to invest
in workers having a short working horizon. Langot and Moreno-Galbis (2013) find that
for homogeneous productivity workers, only positions occupied by young workers are
updated. In contrast, when considering heterogeneous productivity workers, it might be
in the interest of the firm to update positions occupied by high productivity workers
in spite of being old. Considering productivity issues allows the authors to account for
heterogeneous situations within a given age cohort.
In our contribution, productivity differentials among older workers determine their
heterogeneous retirement decisions, i.e. we focus on the supply side, rather than on the
demand. Productivity differentials arising after the shift in the technological frontier come
from heterogeneous training policies: in some jobs workers’ skill are updated after a
technological change while in some other jobs they are not.
We are not the first to analyze the retirement decision from the supply side. Using US
data, Bartel and Sichermann (1993) show that workers in industries with higher average
rates of technological change retire later than workers in industries with lower rates of
technological progress, since they prefer to smooth the human capital investment they
made. On the other hand, an unexpected increase in the rate of technological change
induces earlier retirement, since workers do not have the required skills, and due to their
short working horizon, they are not motivated to invest in human capital formation.
Ahituv and Zeira (2011) suggest another interpretation. They consider that technical
progress is made up of an aggregate part, which affects all sectors and a specific part that
hits only one sector. They show that the specific part of technical progress has a positive
and significant effect on the probability of not working among older workers. This effect
may correspond to the standard skill obsolescence effect. In contrast, aggregate technical
progress implies an increase in wages, encouraging therefore older workers to delay their
retirement age.
Using US data, Friedberg (2003) argues that age is not enough to explain why older
workers use computers less. Impending retirement, which reduces the time horizon to
recoup an investment in new skills, appears to play a major role. The importance of the
working horizon on the retirement choicesmade by workers is also underlined byHairault
et al. (2010). They estimate that the shorter the distance to retirement (whatever the age
of the worker), the lower the probability of being employed. This distance effect becomes
active from ten years before retirement.
Concerning the literature interested in the impact of on-the-job training on the relation-
ship between productivity growth and employment decisions, as remarked by Acemoglu
and Pischke (1998), all workers’ types can benefit from changes in the demand for skills
induced by technological progress if they receive training. Bresnahan et al. (2002) con-
clude that the increased use of information and communication technologies (ICT),
changes in organization practices and changes in products and services, taken together
are the skill-biased technological progress that calls for a higher skilled labor mix and thus
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for an increased importance of training.1 Jobs are on average more and more complex.
Computerization is associated with a decline in the demand for routine manual and cog-
nitive tasks and with an increase in the demand for non-routine abstract tasks requiring
a wider human capital.2
The interplay between technological changes and training is analyzed by Chari and
Hopenhayn (1991), who study the lag between the appearance of a technology and its
peak usage in an OLG model with ongoing technological change and investment in
technology-specific human capital. The interactions between learning by doing, tech-
nological choices and the timing of adoption of new technologies are also analyzed in
Parente (1994) and Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996). Carre and Drouot (2004) consider a
Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) model to analyze how the change in the nature of tech-
nological progress modifies on-the-job learning and, through general equilibrium effects,
unemployment and wage dispersion. Finally, Moreno-Galbis (2012) shows that, by intro-
ducing human capital issues, such as heterogeneous skills, human capital accumulation,
on-the-job training and capital-skill complementarity, in a vintage framework in the style
of Mortensen and Pissarides (1998), the impact of productivity growth on unemployment
rates is magnified.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, from a theoretical point of view,
we combine an overlapping generations model à la Michel and Pestieau (2000) with
a technological diffusion process similar to that proposed in Ahituv and Zeira (2011).
However, we introduce the possibility of skill updating (on-the-job training) in some
types of jobs and analyze how training modifies retirement decisions in case of
technological change. We consider a single generation of individuals that lives two
periods. Individuals work during the first period and must choose whether to work
or not (early retirement) and the number of years they work during the second
period.3 Numerical simulations permit to better understand the retirement choices
of people employed in heterogeneous types of jobs in case of change in the state of
technology.
The second contribution of the paper consists in focusing on the relationship between
productivity and senior’s employment from the supply side (instead of the demand
side, as most of the literature). We exploit a unique cross-sectional French database
drawn from the survey Passage à la retraite (“Transitions from work to retirement”)
conducted in 2006 that contains information about the intended retirement age of
respondents aged between 50 and 69. To investigate the effect of technical change and on-
the-job training on retirement intentions, we use the Changements Organisationnels et
Informatisation survey (COI, “Organizational Changes and Computerization” survey)
conducted in the same year and construct aggregate variables within a local labor market,
made up of a specific industry and occupation. Using such recent databases consti-
tutes a great advantage with respect to the existing literature on the subject, since by
2006 there was no incertitude concerning the diffusion process of new technologies
among occupations.
The main findings of our paper can be summarized as follows. The theoretical frame-
work and numerical simulations predict that workers whose productivity is improved
together with the state of technology (by means of on-the-job training) tend to retire later
than workers who do not receive training and bear a relative skill obsolescence in case
of technological change. These findings are confirmed by our empirical results. In case
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of technological change, workers employed in jobs displaying a high average training rate
plan to retire later than those occupying jobs with a low average training rate. Our find-
ings suggest that on-the-job training may effectively dampen the age bias associated with
technical progress.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the assumptions
and the agent’s behavior of our theoretical model. Section 3 analyzes the model’s predic-
tions by means of numerical simulations. Data and descriptive statistics are displayed in




2.1.1 The life cycle decisions
We consider an overlapping generations framework à la Michel and Pestieau (2000),
where we focus on a single cohort of individuals living for two periods who perfectly
anticipate a shift of the technological frontier between their young period and their
old period. We assume that each period lasts 30 years, so that the young period will
go from the age of 25 to 54 years old and the second period from 55 to 84 years
old. During the first period of life individuals work and earn a wage that will be used
for consumption and saving. During the second period of life individuals can decide
to work for a while or not to work at all. Consumption during this second period is
financed by savings made during the first period, by the wage earned during the sec-
ond period if the individual works and by a retirement pension if the individual does
not work.
Expectations are rational, so that the worker chooses from the very beginning of life the
optimal amount to save during the young period and the intended retirement date so as
to maximize lifetime utility. Because we are mainly interested in the retirement decision
we consider the second period of life as the reference period t, whereas the first period
corresponds to t−1. Therefore, our reference cohort of workers entered the labor market
in t − 1 and became old in t.
2.1.2 The production process
Only one good is produced in the economy. Production only depends on labor, since cap-
ital is supposed to be supplied with an infinite elasticity (the interest rate is exogenous).
Markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive.
We suppose a continuum of ability levels for workers ait . As in Cheron et al. (2011), the
economy includes two types of jobs: simple jobs, where workers do not receive training
and so productivity is not modified when the technological frontier shifts; and complex
jobs, where, following the shift in the technological frontier, workers receive on-the-job
training allowing to index their productivity to the state of technology. We assume that
finding a suitable complex job is more costly (it takes a longer time), so workers decide to
search for a complex position if and only if their expected gains of occupying a complex
job overcome the search cost they bear.
During the first period of life (young period) productivity in simple and complex jobs is
determined exclusively by the worker’s acquired ability. It is assumed that the education
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system is indexed to the technological frontier so that new entrants into the labor mar-
ket are endowed with the newest skills allowing them to be fully productive in the labor
market. We consider that between the first and the second period of life there is a shift
in the technological frontier. Productivity of young people becoming old in complex jobs
is improved since we assume they receive the necessary training, whereas productivity
of individuals employed in simple jobs remains unaffected since these workers do not
receive training.
The distribution of abilities of young workers entering the labor market at date t − 1




. Even if not represented here, these abilities
are assumed to be indexed to the state of technology, denoted by bj for j = t − 1, t.4
Between t − 1 and t, the technological frontier shifts. The new state of technology is
given by bt = (bt−1 + π), where π stands for the shift in the technological frontier
(gap between the state of technology in the first period and the second period). Pro-
ductivity of workers occupied in jobs receiving training (complex jobs) improves by the
same amount as the technological shift, whereas productivity of workers not receiving
training (simple jobs) remains unaffected.5 The term bt can therefore be also inter-
preted as the training effect and it exactly corresponds to the state of technology. At date
t − 1, the productivity of a complex or a simple job equals the ability of the worker. Fol-
lowing the shift in the technological frontier between t − 1 and t, the productivity in
jobs receiving training progresses to ykt = ait−1bt and that of jobs not receiving train-
ing remains equal to ykt = ait−1. Retirement decisions of both types of workers will
thus differ.
2.2 The agent behavior
Pension arrangements provided by the state in most European countries are unfunded,
with benefits paid directly from current workers’ contributions and taxes. Because our
paper analyzes the impact of technological changes on the intended retirement date using
French data, our theoretical framework focuses on the retirement decision in the presence
of a pay-as-you-go system.
A young individual supplies one unit of labor that provides him a wage wkt−1 where









. During the second period of life, the
individual consumes dkt , which depends on savings made during the young period, on
the retirement pension and on the net wage earned if he keeps working during the old
age. Let’s denote by τj for j = t, t − 1 the social security tax rate paid over the wages by
individuals, ρt the replacement rate, R = 1 + r the exogenous interest rate (rate of return
to investment) and zkt the amount of time worked by the individual during the second
period of life (whose duration is normalized to 1). Consumption in the first and second
life periods of individuals belonging to the cohort entering the labor market in t − 1 are
given by:





for k = C, S (complex and simple jobs).
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The individual chooses his savings and proportion of time he will work during his
second period of life so as to maximize his lifetime utility:
Max{skt−1,zkt } ut−1
(
ckt−1, dkt , 1 − zkt
)
= log ckt−1 + β
(



























where β is the rate of time preference and γ corresponds to preference for leisure.6
If the individual stops any working activity at the beginning of the second period of life,
his retirement pension will equal ρwkt for k = C, S.














where ρ is assumed to be exogenously determined by the government,WYt stands for the
wage bill of young workers, WOt for the wage bill of old employed workers, WoSt for the
wage bill associated with old workers employed in simple jobs and WoCt for the wage bill
of old workers employed in complex jobs.
Because the objective of this paper is to analyze the retirement decision of a cohort of
workers, we focus on the budget constraint of the government at date t, when retirement
pensions must be paid. The left hand side corresponds to the amount of retirement pen-
sions paid by the government. In a pay-as-you-go system, pensions paid in period t must
be financed from taxes paid by workers employed in period t. Therefore, the right hand
side stands for taxation revenues coming from young employed workers at period t and
from old workers who keep working during their second period of life.
2.3 The equilibrium
The model’s equilibrium can be summarized by three sets of equations:
• Equality between wages and marginal productivity:
wikt−1 = ait−1 for k = C, S (5)
wiCt = ait−1 · bt where bt > 1 (6)
wiSt = ait−1 (7)
• We assume that in order to have access to complex jobs, the individual needs to make
an additional investment in terms of job search since it takes more time and resources
to find a complex position suiting his own ability. In order to decide whether to make
or not this investment on job search, the worker compares the expected gains and
costs of occupying a complex position:
– Occupying a complex position allows the worker to benefit from a higher gross
wage following the shift in the technological frontier between the first and the
second period of life thanks to training:wiCt −wiSt =ait−1 ·bt−ait−1=ait−1(bt−1).
– The search cost, which is indexed to the state of technology, equals ϕbt .
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The threshold ability level below which it is not in the interest of the young individual
to pay for the search cost is determined by equalizing the expected gains and costs of
occupying a complex position:
ait−1 (bt − 1) = ϕbt ⇒ ai∗t−1 =
ϕbt
(bt − 1) (8)
All individuals having an ability level above ai∗t−1 decide to spend more time on search-
ing for a complex position. Complex positions are then occupied by workers having
a higher ability level since they have higher expected gains. The search costs repre-
sent a kind of filter allowing only the highest ability workers to have access to complex
jobs. A higher search cost reduces the number of abilities for which it is interesting to
search for a complex position. Conversely, the higher the size of the training effect, bt ,
the larger the number of abilities that searches for a complex position.
• The FOCs associated with the optimizing problem (3) are given by:
∂ut−1
∂skt−1
= 0 ⇒ skt−1 =





= 0 ⇒ zkt =
(1 − τt − ρ(1 + γ )) − Rskt−1γ /wkt
(1 + γ ) (1 − τt − ρ) (10)
for k = C, S.
If the individual does not work at all during the second period, i.e. zkt = 0, his savings
and future consumption will equal:
sikt−1 =
β









R (1 − τt)wikt−1 + ρtwikt
)
(12)
where wiSt = ait−1 and wiCt = ait−1bt (see Appendix).
If the individual decides to work during the second period of life, i.e. zkt > 0, his
optimal choice depends on the type of job we consider:
zikt =
(1 − τt) (1 + β) − ρ(1 + β(1 + γ )) − γRβ(1 − τt−1)wikt−1/wikt
(1 − τt − ρ) (1 + β + γβ) (13)
where wiSt = ait−1 and wiCt = ait−1bt (see Appendix).
The analysis of equation (13) allows us to distinguish between three different effects.
The first effect corresponds to the term (1 − τt) (1 + β). The higher the tax individ-
uals pay in the second period the shorter the time they decide to work since their
net wage will be lower. This effect can though be counterbalanced by the time pref-
erence for the future. The second term −ρ(1 + β(1 + γ )) tells us that the higher
the replacement ratio (i.e. the higher the retirement pension) and the higher the pref-
erence for leisure, the less the individual is willing to work in the second period.
Finally, the term −γRβ(1 − τt−1)wkt−1/wkt captures the trade-off between a wealth
effect coming from past savings and a substitution effect coming from the current
wage an old individual may earn if he keeps working. The higher the wage earned
during the first period with respect to the wage earned during the second period the
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lower zkt . While Rβ(1 − τt−1)wkt−1 stands for the wealth effect, 1/wkt represents the
current wage effect (substitution effect). In simple jobs, the last effect is neutralized
by the wealth effect and we find Rβ(1 − τt−1). In contrast, in complex jobs, the wage
effect is dominant. More precisely, since bt > 1, the negative term in equation (13),
that is Rβ(1 − τt−1) 1/bt , is smaller than in a simple position, leading to a higher zCt .
Individuals in complex positions work for a longer period of time.
Replacing in equation (9) yields:
sikt−1 =
1
R(1 + β + γβ)
[
βR (1 − τt−1) (1 + γ )wikt−1 − wikt (1 − τt)
]
(14)
where wiSt = ait−1 and wiCt = ait−1bt (see Appendix).
In complex positions, bt > 1, individuals save less since they anticipate a higher
future wage. Similarly, because in complex positions individuals work for a longer
time and earn a higher wage, future consumption is higher for these individuals
(see Appendix).
2.3.1 The budget constraint
As observed in equation (13), the fraction of time worked during the second period of
life, does not directly depend on the ability distribution. However, it depends on the tax
system, τt and τt−1, the training effect, bt , and the generosity of the retirement system, ρ.
For the sake of simplicity, we normalize abilities of the considered cohort so as they fol-
low an uniform distribution defined between [0, 1]. Education follows the technological
frontier, so new entrants are endowed with the required skills to fully exploit the most
modern technology. Even if our analysis focuses on a single cohort that enters the labor
market in t − 1, when computing the government budget constraint, we must take into
account that part of the government resources employed to pay retirement pensions in




















ReplacingWoSt ,WoCt ,WYt andWOt by their expressions (provided in Appendix) yields:
ρ
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t (τt , τt−1)
(
1 − (ai∗t−1)2) bt2
]
(16)
The government budget constraint endogenously determines the tax rate that must be
paid by the young and the old cohort of workers co-existing at date t. The tax rate levied by
the government to ensure the budget constraint equilibrium depends on bt and zkt , which
are themselves affected by the tax rate. Due to the great number of non-linearities (both




Messe et al. IZA Journal of Labor Economics Page 9 of 28
2.3.2 The retirement decision
What is the threshold value of preference for leisure from which individuals decide not to
work during their second period of life? Setting to zero equation (13) and knowing that
wiSt = ait−1 and wiCt = ait−1bt yields (see Appendix):
γ C = (1 + β) (1 − τt − ρ)
βR (1 − τt−1) 1bt − βρ
(17)
γ S = (1 + β) (1 − τt − ρ)
βR (1 − τt−1) − βρ (18)
The threshold value γ k decreases with the tax rate of the second period while it increases
with the tax rate paid during the young period. That is, to induce individuals to delay
retirement, the government should tax them when they are young and reduce taxes
during their old age. Preference for leisure thus depends on the taxation system.
The trade-off between the wealth effect and the wage effect appears also in the denom-
inator of equations (17) and (18). A dominant wage effect reduces the value of the
denominator increasing the critical value of γ above which individuals decide not to work
during their senior period of life. Again, we observe that while the wealth effect neutral-
izes the substitution effect in simple jobs, the opposite holds true for complex positions
where there is a dominant wage effect. The threshold value γ k above which individuals
decide not to work during their senior period of life is higher for individuals in complex
jobs. Because access to these positions is linked to the acquired ability level of individu-
als, we can claim that higher ability individuals are more likely to work when becoming
seniors.
3 Numerical simulations
The quantitative implications of the model concerning the effects of a shift of the tech-
nological frontier on the retirement decision are presented as a result of computational
exercises. The objective of the numerical simulations is to analyze how a shift in the tech-
nological frontier affects the retirement decision of workers depending on whether they
have benefitted or not from a training process allowing to update their skills. We consider
a particular cohort of workers whose ability distribution is normalized to [0, 1] and it is
assumed to be indexed to the current state of technology.We will analyze their retirement
decision in several scenarios:
• The technological frontier shifts by bt − bt−1 = 0.2.
• The technological frontier shifts by bt−bt−1 = 0.2 and the replacement ratio increases
by ρt − ρt−1 = 0.02.
• The technological frontier shifts by bt − bt−1 = 0.2 and the replacement ratio
decreases by ρt − ρt−1 = −0.02.
• The technological frontier shifts by bt − bt−1 = 0.2 and the search costs increases by
φt − φt−1 = 0.03.
• The technological frontier shifts by bt − bt−1 = 0.2 and the search costs decreases by
φt − φt−1 = −0.03.
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We study the retirement decision of this cohort of workers for a given shift in the tech-
nological frontier and do not consider intergenerational relations. More precisely, we will
not analyze how the working decisions made by our cohort affect working decisions made
by the co-existing cohort of young workers via taxes.7 Our cohort of interest is assumed
to enter the labor market at date t − 1. Under the hypothesis that the economy is ini-
tially at the steady state and that the cohort of workers perfectly anticipates the shift in
the technological frontier between t − 1 and t, we can easily compute the tax rate paid
by the cohort when workers were young as well as the working decision and the tax
rate paid by this same cohort of workers when they become old and the technological
frontier shifts.
The baseline parameters used in computations are shown in Table 1. We adopt the
standard parameter values employed by the literature. More precisely, we consider an
annual interest rate equal to 4% implying that R = 3.24, since each period lasts 30 years.
The rate of time preference between the young and the old period (β) equals 0.33 (as in
Belan et al. (2010)), preference for leisure (γ ) is set to 0.5, search costs of a complex job
equal 33% of the maximum productivity level attainable by the initial cohort of young
workers (φ = 0.33 · at−1) and the replacement ratio (ρ) associated with the pay-as-you
go system equals 0.45.
Our benchmark situation corresponds well to the French economy. Employees in simple
jobs retire at the age of 55 and those in complex jobs at the age of 62.62 years old. Around
66% of the population is occupied in positions where workers receive training in case of
technological change (complex jobs). The tax level equals 26.80%.
From this benchmark situation, a shift in the technological frontier by 0.2 points delays
retirement of people in complex jobs by five years, whereas retirement in simple positions
is delayed by one year and two months (see Table 2). Note that the shift of the techno-
logical frontier improves productivity in complex positions, and thus the wage earned by
these workers. This wage effect overcomes the wealth effect (savings accumulated during
the first life period) and as a result people in complex positions delay retirement. In con-
trast, productivity in simple positions is relatively deteriorated (since these jobs do not
benefit from an increase in productivity). This should tend to relatively advance the retire-
ment decision. However, the reduction in taxes promotes a delay in the retirement date.
The reduction in taxes is explained by two factors: on the one hand, wages earned in com-
plex jobs are higher, which allows to increase the receipts, and on the other hand, people
in complex positions, who benefit from higher pensions, retire later. Both effects together
manage to overcome the increase of the average pension of people going on retirement,
so taxes fall.
In the third row of Table 2 we analyze the same shift in the technological frontier but
we leave taxes constant at the first period level (26.80%). In this case, the technological
improvement will tend to delay the retirement date for workers employed in complex
Table 1 Baseline parameter values
Discount factor R = 3.24
Rate of time preference β = 0.33
Preference for leisure γ = 0.5
Replacement ratio ρ = 0.45
Search cost φ = 0.33 · at−1
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Table 2 The impact of technological change on themainmacroeconomic variables
Retirement age complex Retirement age simple τ a∗
Benchmark 62.62 55.00 0.2680 0.66
b = 0.2 67.88 56.20 0.1834 0.60
b = 0.2 τ = 0.2680 63.74 55.00 0.2680 0.60
b = 0.2 and ρ = 0.02 65.24 55.00 0.2217 0.60
b = 0.2 and ρ = −0.02 69.87 59.73 0.1475 0.60
b = 0.2 and φ = 0.03 67.80 56.06 0.1855 0.66
b = 0.2 and φ = −0.03 67.95 56.32 0.1817 0.55
positions (whose productivity is improved) while the retirement date of people employed
in simple positions remains constant since for them nothing changes with respect to the
benchmark simulation (they pay the same taxes and have the same productivity as before
the technological shift). In relative terms, people employed in simple jobs retire now
earlier than before the technological improvement.8 For workers in complex tasks, the
retirement age is effectively delayed but by a lower amount than in the case where taxes
are allowed to change (in that case, they also benefitted from the reduction in taxes).
A second sensitivity analysis consists in accompanying the shift in the technological
frontier with a variation in the generosity of the retirement system. Since we are simply
testing the sensitivity of the model to a change in some parameter values, we discre-
tionarily assume ρ = 0.02. The fourth row in Table 2 considers an improvement in the
generosity of the system whereas the fifth row assumes a deterioration in the generos-
ity of the system. For the former case, we find that employees in simple jobs will go on
early retirement while those in complex jobs will retire now at the age of 65.24 instead of
67.88 (taxes attaint now 22.17%, instead of 18.34%). For a given shift in the technologi-
cal frontier, the retirement age of workers will be lower the more generous the retirement
pension system. The fifth row in Table 2 confirms these results. When the same techno-
logical shift is combined with a less generous pension system (ρ = −0.02), retirement
age is delayed for both people in complex jobs and people in simple jobs (to 69.87 and
59.73 years old, respectively). Taxes are reduced to 14.75%. Leisure appears clearly as a
normal good whose demand is increased with income.
The last sensitivity analysis considers the effect of a shift in the technological frontier
for various levels of the search cost. As shown by rows 6 and 7 of Table 2, the modification
in the search cost essentially influences the share of workers employed in complex jobs
(it increases when the search cost falls and it is reduced when the search cost increases).
Retirement decisions remain very close to the ones in the second row, when we were only
considering a shift on the technological frontier. As a result, taxes are also barelymodified.
In sum, a shift in the technological frontier yields workers receiving on-the-job training
to delay retirement, since the wage effect manages to overcome the wealth effect. This
delayed retirement age together with the increased wage promotes a reduction in the tax
rate. This reduced tax induces workers not receiving training (i.e. workers in simple jobs)
to delay their retirement age too. In a context of a constant tax rate, the retirement age
of workers in simple jobs remains unaffected. Finally, the positive impact of technological
progress on the retirement age is lower the higher the generosity of the retirement system.
We now turn to micro data to investigate empirically the impact of a technological
change on the retirement intentions of workers depending on whether their productivity
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is indexed to the state of technology, that is, depending on whether workers are trained
or not after a technological change.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
The purpose of our empirical analysis is to assess whether productivity influences
worker’s intended retirement age. Our intuition is close to Bartel and Sichermann (1993)
and Friedberg (2003). In case of a technological change, workers are expected to advance
their retirement date but only if they suffer a drop in their productivity. If their skills are
updated, we expect that technical change encourages workers to delay their exit age.
A difficulty here is that we do not have a direct measure of the worker’s productiv-
ity in our datasets and especially we do not know how it may vary after a shift in the
technological frontier. To overcome this problem, we proceed in the following way. We
argue that workers benefiting from on-the-job training after a technological change will
see their productivity indexed to the state of technology, whereas workers not concerned
with a training program will suffer skill obsolescence. This corresponds well to our theo-
retical framework according to which workers in complex positions see their productivity
improved together with the state of technology, whereas workers in simple jobs suffer
a skill obsolescence process. We combine individual data including information on the
intended exit age of workers and aggregate data on both ICT adoption and participation
to firm-sponsored training session.
4.1 The “Transitions fromwork to retirement” survey
We exploit a unique cross-sectional survey entitled “Transitions fromwork to retirement”
(TWR hereafter) conducted by the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies
in France in 2006. This data set corresponds to an ad hoc module of the annual French
Labour Force survey conducted during that specific year and concerns all people aged
from 50 to 69 years old (so born between 1937 and 1956). Detailed demographic and
economic characteristics of respondents are obtained by matching the TWR survey with
the 2006 Labour Force survey.
Our main variable of interest is the intended retirement age. While some authors have
focused on transitions from work to retirement (see Behaghel et al. (2010)) in France, we
choose to focus on retirement intentions of older workers. Several studies have shown
the relevance of such self-reported indicators. Using the first two waves of the Health and
Retirement Study, Dwyer and Hu (2000) have shown that among workers who planned
at wave 1 to retire by wave 2, more than one half was effectively fully or partially retired
the next wave. Using the same dataset, Benitez-Silva and Dwyer (2005) conclude that
retirement intentions are consistent with rational behavior.
To provide some evidence on the reliability of retirement intentions for the French
case, we have estimated robust correlation between the proportion of workers aged 50-55
years old in 2006 and expecting to leave the labor market at 60 or after, computed at the
industry-occupation level from the 2006 TWR survey, and the proportion of workers aged
55-59 years old still employed five years later, also computed at the industry-occupation
level using the 2011 French Labour Force survey. We find a statistically significant corre-
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Since we are interested in retirement intentions, we focus on respondents who are still
working at the time of the survey (N=5,490).9 Admittedly, this restriction is likely to lead
to a selection bias, since among older respondents, those willing to retire early have pre-
sumably already left the labor market. In Figure 1, we represent the share of employed
workers in the whole population of respondents by age. Among individuals aged 57 years
old or more, those still working account for less than 50% of the total number of respon-
dents. After 60, this share is even less than 20%. A simple strategy to avoid this selection
bias consists in keeping the youngest workers only. Thus, we restrict our sample to work-
ing male respondents aged 55 years old or less and exclude self-employed workers. Also,
we decide to focus on the retirement intentions of men only as the retirement behavior
of women may be more affected by family considerations. This leaves us with a sample of
1,430 male respondents.
Our dependent variable is the age at which workers intend to leave the labor market.
Respondents have to choose one of the three following categories in the TWR question-
naire: i) before reaching 60 years old, ii) between 60 and 64 years old, or iii) after 64 years
old.10 The TRW dataset includes a large set of control variables that may explain retire-
ment intentions. For each respondent, we have information on age, gender, marital status,
health status, educational level, working in private or public sector, job tenure, full-time
or part-time job, and monthly wage.
As noted by Hairault et al. (2010), retirement decisions in France are strongly corre-
lated to financial incentives of the Social Security system and especially to the distance
to the full pension age. In the 2006 TWR survey, individuals report the number of years
they have contributed to the pension system so far. As in 2006, the required number of
contribution years to be entitled to a pension at the highest replacement rate is 40 years,
the distance to the full pension age is obtained by subtracting the number of years indi-
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Figure 1 Share of employed workers in 2006 in France, by age.
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account for the fact that older workers reaching 65 can be entitled to the highest replace-
ment rate, even when they have not contributed during 40 years. Formally, the distance
Di to the full pension age for an individual of age ai having already contributed Ci years is
Di = min{40 − Ci; 65 − Ai}.
4.2 Aggregate data on technological change and productivity
Next, we need some information on the way workers are affected by technological
changes in their work environment and also on the probability that their skills are updated
after such a shock. As far as we know, there is no individual survey that gathers informa-
tion on retirement intentions, technical changes in the work environment and training
participation. So, we choose to merge the TWR individual data on retirement intentions
with aggregate data on ICT adoption and participation to firm-sponsored training session
coming from a matched employer-employee survey on organizational change and com-
puterization (COI) conducted in 2006 by the Ministry of Labour and the Centre d’Etudes
de l’Emploi. As a few sectors are missing in this database, (e.g. associative sector or some
public administrations), we end up with a sample of 1,159male respondents after merging
TWR data with COI.
The employee-level COI survey allows to measure the incidence of technical change
and on-the-job training accounting simultaneously for the industrial and occupational
specificity of the respondent’s job. This is in line with our theoretical model in which
the effect of a technological change on retirement intentions may vary between different
types of jobs. An important issue here consists in the choice of the aggregation level. This
implies a trade-off between having the finest decomposition and having a sufficient num-
ber of individuals in each industry-occupation cell. In what follows, we define industries
using the NAF-36 classification and consider four occupations: managers, technicians,
clerical workers and blue-collar workers.
Our data was collected in 2006, several years after the ICT boom. So simple indicators
of ICT use do not correspond to a technological change. Therefore, we consider the prob-
ability for workers of having experienced a technical change in their work environment
over the last three years.11 We compute this indicator for each industry-occupation cell.
Respondents were also asked whether they have participated over the last three years to
a firm-sponsored training session on the use of new softwares or new computer devices.
We use this information to define for each industry-occupation cell the proportion of
workers having been trained. This type of training relates to some specific skills that may
become quickly obsolete after a technological change. We choose to consider the propor-
tion of trained workers rather than the duration of training, given that 75% of the training
sessions on the use of computer tools last for less than one week. While one week dura-
tion may seem very short, it is in line with the average duration of training sessions in
France in 2006.12 In addition, most training sessions in which older workers participated
were aimed at adapting the worker to the job he already occupied, which does not require
a lot of time.
When working with these aggregate variables, restricting our sample to older work-
ers (above 50) may lead to some selection bias. Indeed, older workers who participate
on a training session on new computer tools may intend to retire later because skill
updating induces improved work opportunities. At the same time, employers may be
tempted to invest in the skills of the employees who intend to postpone their retirement
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age (reverse causality). Potentially, this simultaneity issue may also be problematic for
our indicator of technological change. Retirement intentions of older workers may have
been internalized by employers, therefore influencing their decision of adopting new
technologies.
To address this issue, we follow the approach of Friedberg (2003) by considering work-
ers aged 24-49 rather than workers aged 50 or more when constructing our aggregate
indicators. The underlying idea is that a high likelihood of skill updating among workers
aged 24-49 implies that the gains for the employer are higher than the training cost in
this specific industry-occupation cell. The identifying assumption is to consider that the
training incentives among workers aged 24-49 years are not correlated with their retire-
ment considerations. For a sake of robustness, we have also considered several other age
groups further from retirement, in particular the 25-40 years interval.13 This does not
have any effect on our results.
As our variable of technical change is self-reported by the worker, it may be subject
to classical measurement errors. To ensure the validity of this indicator as a good proxy
for measuring technical change, we exploit the information contained in the COI data at
the employer-level. More precisely, employers are asked about the introduction of some
modern management tools and ICT equipment in their firm, at the time of the survey (in
2006) and also three years before (in 2003). Regarding ICT, we take 15 items into account
and provide a description of these items in Table 3.
We rely on indicators built by Bigi et al. (2013) synthesizing the intensity of ICT use
in 2003 and 2006 by Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) and then compute an
indicator of intensity of technical change for each firm between these two years.14 The
advantage of this indicator of technical change is that it reduces the risk of measurement
error, given that it is directly reported by employers. However, while this variable is com-
puted at the firm-level, it could be that the new ICT tools have been implemented for
some type of jobs but not for others. Consequently, we could miss some information on
the probability of technical change at the industry-occupation level. This information,
Table 3 Presence of ICT tools in productive units
%of productive units with ICT tools 2003 2006
Website 61.2 73.3
Local Area Network (LAN) 61.3 66.7
Intranet 47.9 57.8
Extranet 25.0 30.2
Electronic data interchange system 36.2 45.8
Using an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) 26.6 29.6
Database for research 26.1 28.8
Database on the management of Human Resources 34.5 38.5
Use of software or firmware for research 47.4 49.8
Use of software or firmware for the
management of Human Resources 63.4 65.3
Tools for data analysis 39.5 47.1
Tools for interfacing databases 21.1 28.6
Tools for automated data archiving or research 21.4 27.4
Collaborative tools (groupware) 15.1 21.0
Tools for process modelling 8.8 12.7
Sources: COI (2006)/INSEE-DARES-CEE, Bigi et al. (2013).
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extracted from the employer-level survey, will be used to test the validity of this covariate
at the industry level.
4.3 Descriptive statistics
We build our theoretical model on the main assumption that, in case of technological
change, older workers occupying complex jobs receive training even though their working
horizon is short. Using the 2000 French Complementary Survey on Training, Langot and
Moreno-Galbis (2013) show that 34% of managers and 21% of technicians between 56
and 60 years old still receive firm-sponsored training in case of technological change.
However, these figures may be subject to some selection bias. Indeed, we have already
shown in Figure 1 that after 55, the probability to remain employed falls dramatically.
Using our training variable from the COI employee-level data and restricting our sam-
ple to workers aged 50-55, we investigate whether access to training may vary across jobs
of different skill levels, holding the working horizon constant. We decompose workers
into three groups: the first is close to the full pension age (two years or less), the second
is further from retirement (between three and eight years from the full pension age) and
the third is too far from retirement (nine years or more). As shown in Figure 2, the train-
ing rate is still high for managers, even for those who are at two years or less from the full
pension age, and varies across skill levels.
Now we describe retirement intentions of French male workers in 2006 as well as their
individual characteristics. Table 4 shows that, while 48.6% of occupied male respondents
aged 50-55 intend to exit the labor force between 60 and 64, 38.7% plan to leave before
60 and only 12.7% report an intended exit age of 65 or more. When comparing the dis-
tributions of covariates in each column, we see that the distance to retirement is strongly
positively correlated with intended exit age. This is consistent with previous empirical
findings of Hairault et al. (2010). As the distance to full pension age increases with the exit
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Figure 2 Proportion of trainedmales at different career horizons across skill levels. Note: The career
horizon is defined as the difference between the full pension age and the age of the respondent. The full
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics
Intended retirement age
Variables Less than 60 60-64 65 or more All
Individual characteristics
Age 52.38 52.43 52.38 52.41
Single 0.127 0.160 0.204 0.153
Education
Primary 0.385 0.279 0.293 0.322
Secondary/Vocational 0.510 0.405 0.265 0.428
High School 0.056 0.123 0.156 0.101
Undergraduate 0.031 0.099 0.075 0.070
Graduate/Postgraduate 0.018 0.094 0.211 0.080
Occupation
Managers 0.076 0.250 0.333 0.193
Technicians 0.245 0.250 0.197 0.242
Clerical workers 0.105 0.099 0.116 0.104
Blue-collar workers 0.575 0.400 0.354 0.462
Good/very good health 0.728 0.787 0.816 0.768
Public sector 0.140 0.197 0.143 0.168
Part-time job 0.022 0.036 0.088 0.037
Years to full pension age 3.737 5.535 6.680 4.984
Aggregated variables for workers aged 24-49 years
At the industry-occupation level
Average probability of a technical change 0.344 0.314 0.308 0.325
Average probability of skill updating 0.199 0.227 0.231 0.217
Number of observations 449 563 147 1159
Share of employed workers 38.74% 48.58% 12.68% 100%
Sources: COI (2006)/INSEE-DARES-CEE, TWR survey.
the higher the intended retirement age. 21.1% of individuals who intend to exit their job
after 65 are graduate or post-graduate, while this proportion is equal to 7.9% on average.
Our goal is to study the link between retirement intentions and some characteris-
tics of the work environment affecting productivity, such as the frequency of technical
change or the chance to receive firm-sponsored training, computed at the industry-
occupation level. We find a positive correlation equal to 0.159 between average training
rates observed for a job (for workers aged 24-49) and the intended exit age of workers
occupying that job.While on average training rates equal 21.7%, jobs occupied by workers
reporting the highest intended exit age display average training rates of 23.1% and those
occupied by workers reporting the lowest intended exit age display average training rates
of 19.9%.
Furthermore, there is a negative correlation (equal to -0.143) between the probability of
a technical change at the industry-occupation level and the intended exit age. As shown in
Table 4, jobs occupied by individuals with high intended retirement age are on average less
likely to be hit by a technical change than jobs occupied by workers willing to exit early.
This is consistent with previous findings of Bartel and Sichermann (1993) and Ahituv and
Zeira (2011). However, contrary to the latter, we allow older workers’ skills to be updated
after the shock. So, we examine whether the effect of a technical change on retirement
intentions of workers may depend on the way their productivity is indexed to the state of
technology through on-the-job training.
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5 Econometric results
5.1 Technical change and retirement intentions
We investigate the effect of technical change computed at the industry level on retirement
intentions of older workers. Since the information on individual retirement intentions is
measured by an ordered variable, we turn to an ordered Probit regression to explain the
determinants of retirement intentions.
We first include only a set of individual-specific characteristics described in Table 4.
Then, we add the average probability of technical change in the regression. This vari-
able is introduced in two ways. First, we consider the average probability, computed at
the industry-level, that workers report having experienced a change in the techniques
used over the last three years. Second, we exploit the continuous indicator of the inten-
sity of change in ICT-use, built from employers’ declaration. We decompose this variable
into quartiles and consider for each industry the proportion of workers whose employ-
ers report a high intensity of technical change.15 This allows us comparing our indicator
of technical change, reported by employees, with another measure of change derived
directly from the employer survey. To account for the correlation of observations at
the industry level, we correct standard errors using a clustering procedure following
(Moulton (1990)). Our results are reported in Table 5.
First, we discuss briefly the coefficients obtained by regressing the ordered variable
of intended exit age on our set of individual characteristics (column 1). Since we intro-
duce some indirect determinants of individual wage, like for instance educational level or
occupation, we do not include the wage in the set of covariates to avoid potential mul-
ticollinearity issues.16 The estimates show the salient role of age to predict retirement
intentions, in line with previous results of Taylor and Shore (1995) for the US. Further-
more, the distance to full pension age exerts a strongly positive and significant effect on
the intended exit age, which corresponds well to the horizon effect highlighted byHairault
et al. (2010).17 We also find a positive correlation between intended exit age and both
health status and occupation.
Then, we examine the effect of our industrial indicators of technical change on
the intended exit age of respondents (columns 2 and 3). We obtain similar results
whether we consider our variable of technical change from the employee data or the
indicator directly reported by employers and consequently less subject to measure-
ment error. We find that both variables have a negative and significant effect on the
intended retirement age. As these variables relate to a technical change specific to the
industry, our findings are consistent with the erosion effect highlighted by Ahituv and
Zeira (2011).
5.2 Technical progress, retirement intentions and skill updating
Next we estimate the same ordered regressions as before but consider aggregate variables
at the industry-occupation levels. So, standard errors are now clusterized at the industry-
occupation level. First, we study the effect of the average probability of participating to
firm-sponsored training session on the use of new computer devices on retirement inten-
tions. Recall that this probability is computed for workers aged 24-49, so it allows to
remove a potential simultaneity bias. Then, we investigate how technical change may
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Table 5 Ordered Probit estimates of the intended retirement age, with technical change at
the industry level
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Single 0.169* 0.165* 0.178**
(0.088) (0.087) (0.085)




Secondary/Vocational -0.156** -0.136** -0.147**
(0.072) (0.078) (0.075)
High school -0.007 0.018 -0.008
(0.123) (0.129) (0.124)
Undergraduate -0.234 -0.260 -0.272
(0.222) (0.208) (0.213)




Managers 0.366** 0.373*** 0.359***
(0.135) (0.134) (0.127)
Technicians 0.082 0.140 0.122
(0.117) (0.110) (0.102)
Clerical workers 0.073 0.146 0.114
(0.204) (0.175) (0.207)
Public sector -0.189** -0.252** -0.253***
(0.093) (0.097) (0.090)
Part-time job 0.357* 0.315 0.385*
(0.216) (0.241) (0.216)
Good/very good health 0.192** 0.186** 0.206**
(0.081) (0.084) (0.081)
Years to full pension age 0.160*** 0.161*** 0.163***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Variables of technical change at the industrial level
Average probability of a technical change -1.153***
(0.403)
Proportion of workers in firms
with high intensity of change in ICT use -1.430**
(0.762)
Observations 1159 1159 1159
Log pseudolikelihood -984.67 -979.04 -979.17
Pseudo R2 0.133 0.138 0.138
Note: estimates from ordered Probit model, the dependent variable being equal to 1 when the respondent intends to leave
the labor market before 60, 2 when his intended exit age ranges from 60 to 64, and 3 if he intends to leave the labor market
at 65 or after. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the industry level, significance levels being 1% (***), 5% (**)
and 10% (*). The average probability of technical change is the probability that workers employed in a specific sector report
having experienced a change in the techniques used over the last three years.
The proportion of workers in firms with high intensity of change in ICT (COI employer data) corresponds to the highest
quartile of our synthetic indicator on technical change.
Source: COI (2006)/INSEE-DARES-CEE, TWR survey (2006), French Labour Force Survey 2006.
In column 1, we see that training encourages older workers to delay their retirement
decisions. This finding is in line with previous work of Picchio and Van-Ours (2013),
who suggest additional on-the-job training to maintain older workers in employment
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Table 6 Estimates of intended retirement age, with technical change at the
industry-occupation level
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Aggregated variables for workers aged 24-49 years
Average probability of skill updating (T1) 1.324** -0.396 -0.215
(0.680) (0.964) (0.955)
Average probability of a technical change (T2) -0.803** -0.719***
(0.263) (0.244)
Interaction term (T1 ∗ T2) 4.942*** 5.053***
(1.905) (1.74)
Control variables YES YES YES
Occupation fixed effects YES YES YES
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES
Observations 1159 1159 1159
Log pseudolikelihood -911.79 -926.44
Pseudo R2 0.182 0.184 0.3524
Note: (1) and (2) are estimates from ordered Probit model, the dependent variable being equal to 1 when the respondent
intends to leave the labor market before 60, 2 when his intended exit age ranges from 60 to 64, and 3 if he intends to leave
the labor market at 65 or after. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the industry-occupation level, significance
levels being 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). (3) are estimates from an OLS regression on the latent outcome associated with
retirement intention. The latent variable has been obtained using simulated residuals. The other control variables are those
used in the regressions reported in Table 5.
Source: COI (2006)/INSEE-DARES-CEE, TWR survey (2006), French Labour Force Survey 2006.
or with the work of Behaghel et al. (2010) who show that training reduces significantly
the exit rates among older workers. However, the role of training on retirement inten-
tions turns out to be strongly driven by the interaction with technical change. Indeed,
in column 2, we see that the coefficient associated with the interaction term is strongly
significant and positive while the effect of the probability of skill updating becomes
non significant.
At first sight, this result seems consistent with our theoretical predictions. In jobs with
a high probability of skill updating, technical change may encourage workers to delay
their intended exit age. However, as noted by Ai et al. (2004), the effect of an interaction
term in a non-linear model is difficult to interpret. The problem is even more complex
in our case since the dependent variable is ordered and not binary. To assess the role
played by training, we decide to rely on the latent variable measuring the propensity to
delay the retirement decision. We implement the following methodology to overcome the
unobservability of this latent outcome: let Yi = k be the categorical variable of respon-
dent i measuring retirement intention, with k = 1 when the intended exit age is lower
than 60, k = 2 when it ranges from 60 to 64, and k = 3 when it is higher than 64.
Denoting by Y ∗i the latent outcome such that Y ∗i = βXi + i (Xi is the set of control
variables), we know that Yi = k when μk < Y ∗i ≤ μk+1, where μ0 is set to −∞ and
μ3 to +∞. The problem we must solve is that of the unobservability of Y ∗i . A sim-
ple solution is to rely on the methodology of simulated residuals originally proposed by
Gouriéroux et al. (1987).
The first step is to estimate by maximum likelihood the ordered Probit model as done
in Table 6, which gives consistent estimates for βˆ and μˆk . Then, residuals i are drawn
from the normal distribution for each respondent until the condition μˆk < βˆXi + i ≤
μˆk+1 is satisfied. The latent outcome Y ∗i is such that Y ∗i = βˆXi + i.18 The final
step is to estimate Y ∗i as a function of Xi using an OLS regression. The regression
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includes both the average probability of skill updating, the average probability of techni-
cal change and an interaction term crossing these two covariates. As shown in column 3
of Table 6, we find very comparable results for the ordered regression on the categorical
retirement variable and for the OLS model estimated on the latent propensity to delay
retirement.19
Using the method of simulated residuals, we can now interpret the interaction term
in a straightforward way. We see in column 3 of Table 6 that the negative effect of the
average probability of a technical change, computed at the industry-occupation level, on
the workers’ propensity to delay their retirement decision may become strongly positive
if the average training rate is sufficiently high. To provide a graphical illustration, we plot
the propensity to delay the retirement decision as a function of the average probability of
technical change, setting the probability of skill updating to 0 (simple jobs) in one case
and to 1 (complex jobs) in the other case.
The magnitude of the interaction term is determined by examining the difference
in slopes between the two lines. We report using horizontal lines in Figure 3 the two
threshold values obtained from the ordered Probit model (column 2 of Table 6). The
first threshold μ1 = 9.91, represented by the lower horizontal dash-dotted line, corre-
sponds to the value of the latent outcome below which respondents intend to leave their
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Figure 3 Marginal effect of technical change on the propensity of older workers to delay their
retirement decision. Lecture: The latent outcome associated to the ordered intended retirement age (with
three categories) is obtained by the methodology of simulated residuals. The lower horizontal dash-dotted
line represents the threshold value of the latent outcome below which the respondents intend to leave their
job before 60. This value is μ1 = 9.91. The upper horizontal dash-dotted line represents the threshold value
of the latent outcome value of the latent outcome above which respondents intend to leave their job at 65
or after. This value is μ2 = 11.73. Both thresholds are those from the ordered Probit regressions explaining
intended retirement age, whose estimates are used when applying the method of simulated residuals. The
dashed decreasing line represents the latent outcome as a function of the average probability of technical
change, computed at the industry-occupation level, in the case where the average training rate computed at
the industry-occupation level among the workers aged 24-49 years old, is set to 0. The solid increasing line
stands for the latent outcome as a function of the average probability of technical change in the case where
the average training rate is set to 1.
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dash-dotted line, stands for the value of the latent outcome above which respondents
intend to leave their job at 65 or after.
Figure 3 shows that the dashed line, corresponding to simple jobs, is decreasing with the
average probability of technical change. So, in absence of training, technical change dis-
courages older workers to continue their activity. While in simple jobs without technical
change, workers may intend to exit the labour force between 60 and 64, a high probability
of technical change leads these workers to advance their retirement intentions to less than
60 years old. The solid line in Figure 3, corresponding to complex jobs, is increasing with
the average probability of technical change. So, in jobs in which productivity is indexed to
the shift in the technological frontier, technical change may encourage older workers to
retire later.
For complex jobs, the erosion effect of technical change is not only mitigated by train-
ing but is rather reversed. In some stable work environment (low probability of technical
change), the intended exit age ranges from 60 to 64. However, in jobs characterized
by a high probability of technological change (higher than 0.45 as shown in Figure 3),
workers expect to leave their job at 65 or after if they benefit from training to update
their skills. This is in line with our previous empirical results, when we found that the
effect of training on retirement intentions was strongly driven by the degree of technical
change.
5.3 Robustness check
The positive and significant interaction term found in Table 6 may reflect the fact that
high-ability workers are less affected by technological change than low-ability workers
simply because they receivemore training.20 Even though dealing properly with this selec-
tion issue is not really possible with data on hand, we test whether this interaction term
remains positive and significant by making a distinction between managers and the rest
of the workers, that is, between workers having the highest probability of receiving train-
ing and the rest of the workers. Specifically, we run the same estimates as in columns 2
and 3 of Table 6 for each category of workers. Since the average probability of a technical
change and the average probability of receiving training are computed at the industry-
occupation level, we exploit the variability across industries. We present the obtained
results in Table 7.
In the absence of training, we find that the average probability of technological change
affects negatively the intended retirement age of all workers, regardless on whether they
are managers or not. Then, if workers’ skills are not updated, the erosion effect applies for
all type of workers, even the high-ability ones. We also obtain a positive and significant
coefficient associated with the interaction term for managers. This suggests that training
stronglymatters whenwe study the effect of technical change on the retirement intentions
of older workers, even for high-ability ones.
These findings put forward that what matters regarding retirement intentions and espe-
cially early exit decisions is not the technical change but the way the productivity of the
job is indexed to the shift of the technological frontier (through on-the-job training).
So, technical progress will not necessarily encourage older workers to early retirement if
employers allow their productivity to be indexed to the state of technology through a bet-
ter access to training. This provides some evidence of the major role on productivity as a
determinant of retirement decisions.
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Table 7 Estimates of the intended retirement age by occupation, with technical change at
the industry-occupation level
Managers Other occupations
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Aggregated variables for workers aged 24-49 years
Average probability of skill updating (T1) -0.732 -0.625 -0.034 -0.562
(1.125) (0.920) (0.758) (0.639)
Average probability of a technical change (T2) -2.951 -3.250** -1.048*** -1.204***
(1.963) (1.618) (0.254) (0.255)
Interaction term (T1 ∗ T2) 7.643* 8.961*** 0.904 2.085
(4.466) (3.680) (1.612) (1.392)
Control variables YES YES YES YES
Occupation fixed effects NO NO NO NO
Industry fixed effects NO NO NO NO
Observations 224 224 935 935
Log pseudolikelihood -183.59 -782.91
Pseudo R2 0.0993 0.225 0.124 0.255
Note: (1) and (3) are estimates from ordered Probit model, the dependent variable being equal to 1 when the respondent
intends to leave the labor market before 60, 2 when his intended exit age ranges from 60 to 64, and 3 if he intends to leave
the labor market at 65 or after. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the industry-occupation level, significance
levels being 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). (2) and (4) are estimates from an OLS regression on the latent outcome associated
with retirement intention. The latent variable has been obtained using simulated residuals. The other control variables are
those used in the regressions reported in Table 5.
Source: COI (2006)/INSEE-DARES-CEE, TWR survey (2006), French Labour Force Survey 2006.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the role of productivity as a determinant of the workers’
retirement behavior.Whilemany studies have already analyzed the impact of senior work-
ers’ productivity on the firm’s hiring and firing decision, our empirical analysis focuses on
retirement intentions.
The main contribution of our paper is to show that in some jobs, characterized by a
high training rate, technical change may induce workers to delay their retirement date.
Using French data, we estimate that in jobs with a high probability of skill upgrading,
the probability of a technical change computed at the industry-occupation level has a
positive effect on the individual propensity to delay the retirement decision. However, in
absence of training, technical change has a negative effect on the propensity to postpone
the retirement decision. So, training may dampen the erosion effect of technical change
on the retirement decision.
As it stands, this study has a few limitations. From a theoretical perspective, we do
not endogenize in our framework the propensity of firms to train their older workers.
From an empirical perspective, we decompose jobs by industry and occupation cells, but
it would be useful to control for the characteristics of the firm in which each respondent is
employed. Matched employer-employee data with information on retirement intentions
would make possible to assess whether our findings may result from different employers’
management practices regarding either the decision of adopting new technologies or the
training policy within the firm.
Endnotes
1 Other major contributions to the skill-biased technological progress literature are
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2See Goos and Manning (2007), Autor et al. (2003), Autor et al. (2006), Spitz-Oener
(2006) or Maurin and Thesmar (2004).
3 Individuals perfectly anticipate the shift in the technological frontier between the
first and the second period. For simplicity, we do not analyze the impact that the work-
ing decisions adopted by our cohort of interest concerning their old period have on the
co-existing cohort of young workers via taxes. Similarly, we assume that productivity dif-
ferentials between the young and the old cohort of workers will not influence the labor
supply decision of the old cohort. Therefore, the consequences of potential interactions
across cohorts are not analyzed here.
4Because we are exclusively analyzing the cohort entering the labor market in t − 1,










5 Because education is assumed to be indexed to the state of technology, the ability
distribution associated with the new cohort of young workers entering the labor market
in t will equal ait =
[
ait , ait
] = [ait−1bt , ait−1bt]. The new cohort of young workers has
then the same ability distribution as the previous cohort, but shifted by bt . This implies
that the relative productivity of senior workers in simple jobs is deteriorated, while that
of senior workers in complex jobs does not differ from the productivity of the new
cohort.
6This parameter includes all non monetary factors affecting the financial trade-off of
the retirement decision. It covers socio-economic factors, working conditions or health
status.
7 Intuitively, we easily deduce that a higher tax rate τt will lead the new cohort of
workers entering the labor market at date t to save less during the first period and work
for a longer time during the second period. Similarly, productivity differentials between
young workers entering the labor market and old workers, could discourage seniors to
work. This type of interactions is behind the scope of this paper.
8 If we had considered the demand side, we would probably observe an increase in
the firing rate of these senior workers since their relative productivity with respect to the
new cohort of workers entering the labor market is reduced. Because our model focuses
on a single cohort, this type of interactions between cohorts is not considered. Moreover,
in our case, we are considering a supply-side model.
9Overall, the TWR survey includes 12,451 individuals and contains three different
parts. Part A includes all individuals aged 50-69 years old who are still working at the
time of the survey. Part B is made up of individuals who are out of the labour force at the
time of the survey, but who have already worked. Finally, part C concerns individuals who
have never worked. Here we restrict our sample to workers interviewed in part A.
10There is also a “Don’t know” category, which concerns only 54 respondents. These
observations were discarded in our empirical analysis.
11More precisely individuals were asked: “Has your work changed over the last three
years because of a change in the techniques used?”.
12Using data from the Continuing Vocational Training Survey conducted on a repre-
sentative sample of French firms, Lambert et al. (2009) show that the average duration of
a training spell is 28 hours.
13These additional results are available upon request.
14The MCA generates quantitative scores or “dimensions” that maximize the average
correlation among the qualitative variables. The indicator of ICT-intensity used for each
firm in 2006 is computed by regressing the first dimension, reflecting the intensity of use
of ICT tools, on the 15 items reported in Table 3. The estimated coefficients represent the
weight of each item and can be interpreted as a metric, determined by the set of situations
specific to 2006. The synthetic indicator is obtained from a weighted sum of these items.
Note that this metric estimated in 2006 has been used to compute the synthetic indicator
of intensity of ICT use in 2003 for temporal comparison, as recommended by Greenan
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and Mairesse (2006). For more details about the methodology, see Greenan andMairesse
(2006) and Bigi et al. (2013).
15The high intensity of technological change is measured by the last quartile of the
continuous indicator.
16We have also estimated the same regressions introducing wage as a control variable
and reach similar conclusions. These additional estimates are available upon request.
17We have also estimated an ordered regression with seniority as additional covari-
ate. This does not affect the positive coefficient associated with the distance to the full
pension age.
18For a recent application of simulated residuals to recover a latent variable, seeWolff
(2012).
19To check the validity of our results, we have also extended Ai et al. (2004) method
to the case of an ordered probit specification. We compute the average marginal effect
of the interaction term on each probability of selecting a specific age group for exit age
and determine the corresponding standard errors using the delta method. Details on
calculation and results are available upon request.
20Using French data Lambert et al. (2009) show that high ability workers (especially
managers) have the highest access rate to training.
Appendix
Detailed equations of the theoretical model
If the individual does not work during his second period of time, i.e. zCt = zSt = 0, we have:
siSt−1 =
β




R(1 + β) =
β











R(1 + β) =
β










R (1 − τt)wit−1 + ρtwit
) = β1 + β
(






R (1 − τt)wit−1 + ρtwit
) = β1 + β
(
R (1 − τt) ait−1 + ρtait−1bt
)
If the individual decides to work during the second period of life, i.e. zkt > 0 for k = C, S,
his optimal choices depend on the type of job we consider:
ziCt =
(1 − τt) (1 + β) − ρ(1 + β(1 + γ )) − γRβ(1 − τt−1) 1/bt
(1 − τt − ρ) (1 + β + γβ)
ziSt =
(1 − τt) (1 + β) − ρ(1 + β(1 + γ )) − γRβ(1 − τt−1)
(1 − τt − ρ) (1 + β + γβ)
Savings are obtained by replacing in equation (9):
siCt−1 =
1
R(1 + β + γβ)
[




R(1 + β + γβ)
[
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Future consumption is then given by:
diCt = R
[ 1
R(1 + β + γβ)
[
βR (1 − τt−1) (1 + γ )ait−1 − ait−1bt (1 − τt)
]]
+ (1 − τt) ait−1bt
[1 − τt − ρ + β(1 − τt − ρ(1 + γ )) − γRβ(1 − τt−1) 1/bt




1 − 1 − τt − ρ + β(1 − τt − ρ(1 + γ )) − γRβ(1 − τt−1) 1/bt




R(1 + β + γβ)
[
βR(1 − τt−1) (1 + γ )ait−1 − ait−1 (1 − τt)
]]
+ (1 − τt) ait−1
[1 − τt − ρ + β(1 − τt − ρ(1 + γ )) − γRβ(1 − τt−1)




1 − 1 − τt − ρ + β(1 − τt − ρ(1 + γ )) − γRβ(1 − τt−1)
(1 − τt − ρ) (1 + β + γβ)
)
The budget constraint at date t equals:
ρ
[















































WOt = zSt (τt , τt−1)
∫ ai∗t−1
0













Setting to zero equation (13) leads to:
γ kR = (1 + β) (1 − τt − ρ)
βR(1 − τt−1) wt−1wt − βρ
for k = C, S.
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